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The article takes as its point of departure some of the
author’s multidisciplinary projects. Special attention is given
to the question of whether the disciplines united in the vari-
ous research team members already constituted a kind of
‘inter-discipline’, through which a single object was studied.
The issue of how the disciplinary orientations of the research
team members occasionally clashed, on methodological
issues, is also addressed.
The outcomes of these and similar multidisciplinary research
projects are followed back into legal practice and academic
legal scholarship to uncover whether an incorporation prob-
lem indeed exists. Here, special attention will be given to
policy recommendations and notably proposals for new leg-
islation. After all, according to Van Dijck et al., the typical
role model for legal researchers working from an internal
perspective on the law is the legislator.
The author concludes by making a somewhat bold case for
reverse incorporation, that is, the need for (traditional) aca-
demic legal research to become an integral part of a more
encompassing (inter-)discipline, referred to here as ‘conflict
management studies’. Key factors that will contribute to the
rise of such a broad (inter-)discipline are the changes that
currently permeate legal practice (the target audience of tra-
ditional legal research) and the changes in the overall
financing of academic research itself (with special reference
to the Netherlands).
Keywords: legislator, legal research, academic research, con-
flict management studies, inter-discipline
1 Introduction
The central question running through this Erasmus Law
Review special issue is: ‘How can we translate and incor-
porate the various non-legal disciplines and their find-
ings into the language of legal doctrine?’ Adequate eval-
uation of positive law requires at least some critical dis-
tance regarding the law and inclusion of insights from
other relevant disciplines. Yet at the same time, such
(partially) external insights are not easily incorporated
into the internal perspective of doctrinal legal analysis.
* Erasmus School of Law, Erasmus University Rotterdam.
In their introductory contribution to this issue, Sanne
Taekema and Wibren van der Burg have argued that the
opposition between legal doctrinal research and inter-
disciplinary research must be transcended.
At the 2014 symposium that constituted the precursor
of this special issue, I was asked to address this incorpo-
ration problem on the basis of one or more concrete case
studies. In view of my involvement in several multidis-
ciplinary research projects, I have taken the liberty to
take four of these projects as the basis for my analysis.
This choice has enabled me to rethink, as an insider,
whether such an incorporation problem has indeed sur-
faced and if so, when and how. In doing so, I will make
an effort to tie my own experiences in with ongoing dis-
cussions and observations reported by others in academ-
ic literature.
At the outset, I should clarify that my track record in
academic research has developed mainly in the domain
of comparative law and from there into the comparative
analysis of dispute resolution methods. Thus in my
research, solutions offered through (domestic) law
always had to be juxtaposed, either to foreign legal solu-
tions or to solutions achieved through strategies other
than ‘juridification’ and litigation in a court of law.
There were, therefore, always two axes of comparison
on the horizon.
Differences and similarities observed through such jux-
tapositions require explanations or at least an effort
thereto. As scientific explanation cannot be generated
from within an internal legal research perspective, it is
not surprising that comparative law and comparative
dispute resolution are fields where external perspectives
on law are traditionally brought in, through disciplines
such as political history, sociology, conflict psychology,
game theory, and economics.1 My former head of
department in comparative law even devoted her inau-
gural lecture to the need for multidisciplinary research
in teams and quoted the following ironical observation
made by Feldbrugge:
When lawyers as a side-line indulge in what they con-
sider scientific work, their method is usually to take
up a subject, read and think about it, and hope vague-
ly that all this will result in conclusions which are in
some way interesting, useful, surprising etc. The
1. On the distinction between the internal and external method, see, inter
alia, R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire (1986).
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choice of a subject is dictated by personal taste (of the
author himself, his publisher, his boss etc.) and there
are almost no rules concerning research methods,
except the one which says that the more legal provi-
sions, cases and other material you read, the better
the research.2
On a personal note: studying legal rules just for the sake
of those rules and their coherence within a legal system
has never truly caught my fascination. I have always
been more interested in the real world, notably in what
drives key actors to press for rules and what makes the
addressees, involved in a conflict, decide to go for a
rule-based strategy or not to end the conflict. In the real
world, resorting to law is just one out of many ways to
address conflicts.
Hereafter, in part 2, I will first describe the gist of four
multidisciplinary projects I was involved in. Special
attention will be given to the question of whether the
disciplines united in the various research team members
already constituted a kind of ‘inter-discipline’, through
which a single object was studied. The issue of how the
disciplinary orientations of the research team members
occasionally clashed, on methodological issues, will also
be addressed. At any rate, the outcomes of these multi-
disciplinary projects were largely based on insights from
the empirical sciences. The central theme connecting all
projects was human conflict strategies and governance.
The conflict strategies always encompassed authorita-
tive judicial intervention as opposed to informal conflict
and problem resolution, procured by disputants autono-
mously (including mediation). The governance levels
ranged from the state level (in projects 1 and 2) to cor-
porate and family levels (projects 3 and 4).
It makes sense to move beyond the four projects next, in
part 3 (building blocks of a human conflict inter-disci-
pline), to gain a more comprehensive overview of the
development of research generally, at the crossroads of
judicial and autonomous conflict resolution. Although
in recent times empirical insights from various disci-
plines seem to have become hijacked for governmental
austerity agendas, truly useful insights can still be distil-
led.
As a next step (part 4), an attempt is made to uncover
whether a problem of incorporating such empirical find-
ings into legal doctrine indeed exists. Here, special
attention will be given to policy recommendations and
notably proposals for new legislation. After all, accord-
ing to Van Dijck et al., the typical role model for legal
researchers working from an internal perspective on the
law is the legislator.3 Whenever this legislator role mod-
el is adopted, Taekema and Van der Burg speak of legal
doctrinal research in a broad sense.
As the four projects were all commissioned by the Neth-
erlands’ government, the incorporation issue will neces-
2. F.J.M. Feldbrugge, ‘Sociological Research Methods and Comparative
Law’, in M. Rotondi (ed.), Inchieste di Diritto Comparato, Vol. 2: Aims
and Methods of Comparative Law (1973), at 215.
3. G. van Dijck, S. van Gulijk & M. Prinsen, ‘Wat doet de juridische onder-
zoeker?’, 31 Recht der Werkelijkheid 1, at 44ff. (2010).
sarily be analysed in regard to Dutch law and doctrinal
research only. In regard to my home jurisdiction, I come
to the conclusion that the insights generated by the
empirical sciences (broadly referred to as ‘conflict man-
agement studies’) are essentially ‘cannibalised’ in legal
doctrinal research and publications: only those findings
are incorporated that can be translated into doctrinal
legal concepts.
I will conclude my contribution (part 5) by making a
somewhat bold case for reverse incorporation, that is, the
need for (traditional) academic legal research to become
an integral part of the more encompassing (inter-)disci-
pline referred to as ‘conflict management studies’. Key
factors that will contribute to the rise of such a broad
(inter-)discipline are the changes that currently perme-
ate legal practice (the target audience of traditional legal
research) and the changes in the overall financing of aca-
demic research itself (with special reference to the
Netherlands). Arguably, such reverse incorporation
goes one step further than, for instance, Sullivan’s view
that legal doctrinal research itself is interdisciplinary
and in that particular sense distinctive.4 That view leans
heavily on a one-way infusion of empirical insights into
autonomous legal research, whereas I believe there are
good reasons to – conversely – impart insights from the
law into at least those branches of the empirical sciences
that concern themselves with human conflict.
Law with its concern for equal protection may be
instrumental in completing the quarter-turn rotation
that I plead, away from the austerity bias in empirical




Four projects are considered here, on a two-by-two
basis.
2.1 Bench Marking and Court-Referred
Mediation
The first two projects focused on the administration of
justice in different European legal systems and the role
therein of mediation. It may be helpful to view the han-
dling of litigation by courts as a provision of state-fun-
ded ‘judicial’ services that can be studied from the sup-
ply side but also from the demand side. The first proj-
ect, Bench Marking – An international comparison of the
mechanisms and performance of the judiciary system, con-
centrated on the supply side.5 It had been commissioned
by the Netherlands Council for the Judiciary to a team
of economists and comparative lawyers. The targeted
audience of this research was, in a sense, the Treasury.
4. K.M. Sullivan, ‘Foreword: Interdisciplinarity’, Michigan Law Review, at
1217-1226 (2007).
5. J. Blank, M. van der Ende, B. van Hulst & R. Jagtenberg, Bench Marking
in an International Perspective. An International Comparison of the
Mechanisms and Performance of the Judiciary System (2004).
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Are there any objective standards by which the Treas-
ury can decide whether more or less resources should be
invested in the judiciary, lacking a genuine market
mechanism for judicial services? The answer that pres-
ents itself is by comparing the input/output ratio of the
Dutch judicial system to the input/output ratios for the
judiciary in neighbouring countries. ‘Input’ was opera-
tionalised as financial resources invested in salaries and
equipment and ‘output’ as number of cases decided and
processing time. What we are looking at here is, in other
words, the productivity, or business efficiency, of the
courts. At this point, legal academics and practitioners
may wonder: aren’t these data at a much too aggregated
level? Many intermediate factors of a technical-legal
nature will be co-determinant of, for instance, the num-
ber of judgments produced. It became indeed the role of
the legal academics and practitioners to qualify the
results delivered through the dominant method of quan-
titative economic analysis in this project, one such inter-
mediary factor being the availability and use of informal
mechanisms such as mediation.
This takes us to the second project, the Practice of Court-
referred Mediation in Countries neighbouring the Nether-
lands.6 This time, the focus was primarily on the
demand for judicial services, albeit that a central issue
was how this demand could be manipulated, by granting
the courts power to mandatorily refer litigants to media-
tion or, at the other extreme, by leaving it up entirely to
the parties to opt for mediation voluntarily, whenever
litigation was considered. Naturally, we were also inter-
ested in any arrangements representing shades of grey in
between these black and white extremes. This project
was commissioned by the Netherlands Ministry of Jus-
tice, and it ran parallel to a purely domestic investiga-
tion, monitoring the first nationwide experiments with
court-referred mediation in this country. In the Dutch
experiment, the mediation option was explained to liti-
gants by letter or orally by the judge, but in the end, it
was for the parties to decide whether to choose media-
tion or to continue with their litigation in court. During
the experiment, mediation was also available free of
charge for litigants. The Ministry was interested, how-
ever, to what extent the number of mediated settlements
would rise or fall if parties would be more or less press-
ed into mediation and/or when they would have to pay
for the services of a mediator themselves. Manipulating
these variables within a first national experiment would
make the domestic research design too complicated, but
as it was well known that neighbouring countries had
various costs arrangements in place while operating by
varying degrees of compulsion, a comparative (Europe-
an) format was again resorted too. The other disciplines
represented in this project were sociology of law and
policy administration: most of the available empirical
studies in the other European countries (that our project
sought to synthesise) can be characterised as sociolegal
6. A. de Roo and R. Jagtenberg, De praktijk van mediation in ons omrin-
gende landen (2003). Presently the ministry is referred to as the Minis-
try of Security and Justice.
research, while the overall monitoring of the project was
shared between legal academics and government offi-
cials trained in policy administration.
2.2 Costs and Opportunities and Multiproblem
Families
The focus of the third and the fourth project was not on
the state level of governance, but on the corporate level
and on the family level, respectively. Both these projects
were domestic in outlook and concentrated on the dif-
ferent pathways for dealing with developing conflicts
and on the amounts of escalation and costs arising along
these various pathways. Project 3, Costs and Opportuni-
ties: an Inquiry into Individual Labour Conflicts within the
Dutch Police Force, was commissioned by an agency rep-
resenting both the employees and the employer of the
Netherlands police, i.e. the police trade unions, and (at
that time) the Ministry of the Interior.7
The aim was to uncover what disputants themselves
perceived as the ultimate cause of the conflicts at work
they had become involved in and to ascertain the rela-
tive frequency of formal (rule-based) and informal
(negotiation-based) approaches to end the conflict. The
obvious formal approach is by imposing orders (the
employer) and appealing against such orders through
the civil servant courts (the employee); informal
approaches would include direct negotiation as well as
mediation. Last but not least, the costs to be associated
with these approaches were to be assessed. The research
team consisted of legal scholars and economists, and the
target audience was the said agency. Both agency part-
ners, i.e. the government employer and the unions, were
interested to see what organisational costs and personal
costs were involved in each approach and, if necessary,
to put this as a key HRM issue on the national agenda.
Whereas policemen are, on average, reasonably well
educated and conversant with the law, the opposite
tends to be true for the population in the fourth project:
the members of multiproblem families. This project,
Socio-economic Returns on Family Group Conferencing for
Dutch Multi-Problem Families, was commissioned by the
non-profit foundation that facilitates family group con-
ferences in the Netherlands, the EKC (Eigen Kracht
Centrale).8 Where a family is in trouble (e.g. poverty,
educational failure, youth delinquency, housing prob-
lems), the members of the family network themselves
can be activated to solve (part of) these problems auton-
omously, without outside intervention by professionals
(psychologists, the judiciary issuing supervision orders).
To this end, the conferences are convened with EKC
assistance. Other researchers had already established
that the quality of solutions achieved through the family
group approach did not differ much from outcomes ach-
ieved through professional interventions. In our project,
7. R. Jagtenberg, A. de Roo, J. Blank & B. van Hulst, Kosten en kansen.
Een onderzoek naar individuele arbeidsconflicten binnen de Neder-
landse politie (2006).
8. A. de Roo and R. Jagtenberg, ‘Socio-Economic Returns on FGC for
Dutch Multi-Problems Families’, in R. Clarijs and Th. Malmberg (eds.),
The Quiet Revolution (2012), at 149-60.
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we had to find out about the costs to be associated with
the autonomous approach as opposed to an interven-
tionist approach. Again the methodological device of
conflict development pathways was used, and again the
research team consisted of economists and legal schol-
ars. The target audience was the community of youth
care professionals and the responsible government min-
istries, the purpose being to make them aware of the
cost implications of each choice (autonomy or interven-
tion) in their decision-making process.
2.3 Clashes between Disciplines
I now come to the question of whether the disciplines
represented by the research team members already con-
stituted a kind of ‘inter-discipline’ and how the discipli-
nary orientations of the research team members occa-
sionally clashed, on methodological issues.
Staying in line with the symposium discussions, I will
define an inter-discipline as a joint enterprise fuelled by
different vested academic disciplines (such as law, eco-
nomics, psychology), where there is a single research
object, a common target audience, and a single underly-
ing rationale for doing the research, whereby use is
made of various discipline-specific methods cumulative-
ly; upon mutual agreement, one particular method may
have been selected as the dominant (or primary) meth-
od. A once-only project carried out this way does not
establish a new inter-discipline yet. Only when a novel
particular combination of disciplines and methods is
used time and again to study a single object (usually
because peers will have accepted the combination as
adding significantly to scientific knowledge) then we
may speak of an (acknowledged and accepted) inter-dis-
cipline.
In this sense, law and economics is such an inter-disci-
pline, whereby legal rules are the object and the micro-
economic toolbox constitutes the dominant method. Are
research projects 1, 3, and 4 (Bench Marking, Costs and
Opportunities, and Multi-problem Families) for that rea-
son to be characterised as law and economics projects? I
would say no.
As to Bench Marking, the emphasis is not on the alloca-
tive efficiency of legal rules as the end product of legal
systems, but on the productive efficiency of the key
actors producing such rules (whatever their contents).
This emphasis has allowed more legal scholarship and
practical experience to play a role, in interpreting the
quantitative data and formulating conclusions. Both dis-
ciplines being allowed to play a role, (friendly) ‘clashes’
or rather corrections by the legal researchers occurred
both in regard to the research design and in regard to
the interpretation of outcomes. Thus it became clear
soon that it would not be so hard to find key data such
as the number of judges per 100.000 inhabitants and the
number of cases concluded per 1,000 inhabitants. As
legal scholars, bearing in mind that there are numerous
aspects of national legal cultures involved as intermedi-
ate variables contributing to the input/output figures,
variables that could turn the whole exercise into an
‘apples and oranges’ comparison, a methodological
‘case’ was made (and ‘won’) to plot the legal systems
under survey along some key legal features (‘descrip-
tors’) likely to be co-determinant of the output data.9
Although it turned out to be virtually impossible to
ascertain the precise impact of all these intermediate
variables on the input and output figures, at least these
figures were now related to their larger context and
warned the reader to handle the key data found as mere-
ly indicative and requiring careful interpretation. For
example, courts in Poland appeared to be much more
productive (in terms of cases decided per judge) than
courts in the Netherlands. Here the insights of the legal
scholars and notably the legal practitioners in the proj-
ect supervisory committee (e.g. a member of a European
association of judges) were crucial in identifying a rela-
tionship between court performance and the availability
of informal dispute resolution schemes (ADR). A plau-
sible interpretation of the figures that presented itself
then was that in countries with many ADR filter mecha-
nisms, such as the Netherlands, the simple disputes are
filtered out, so that the more complicated cases remain to
be solved by the courts; and these remaining complex
cases will take much more time to decide, hence less
cases decided per judge. Whereas courts in a country
that lacks ADR filters, like Poland, can retain large
numbers of relatively simple cases that will easily push
up total output figures, giving the impression of great
efficiency – an interesting example of how misleading
quantitative data and pure economic productivity analy-
sis may be.
Could project 3, Costs and Opportunities, be character-
ised then as materialising the inter-discipline of law and
economics? Again, the answer should be no. In this
project, the methods used by the economists largely
bordered on accountancy, pricing particular services
and interventions, and procuring the quantitative analy-
sis. The same applies to project 4, on Multi-problem
Families. Here, however, an interesting clash surfaced
during an on-the-side conference involving researchers
specialised in the field of professional youth care inter-
ventions versus family group self-help. The focal point
was the randomised controlled trial (RCT) method. The
RCT method is regarded as the ‘golden standard’ in
pharmaceutical research to test new medical drugs.
Patients are randomly selected for an experimental
group (that receives the new drug) and a control group
(receiving a placebo). Now some experimental psycholo-
gists argued that this method must also be deployed to
test professional youth care interventions and even to
test the effectiveness of families resorting to their own
networks for assistance with a variety of pedagogical
problems. However, in regard to the latter, Dutch law
prescribes that resorting to one’s own family network
for making a sound plan is a fundamental right, at least
in those cases where judicial intervention through issu-
ance of a court supervision order (ondertoezichtstelling) is
pending. Only where the EKC-supported family net-
work itself cannot come up with a sound plan, minors
9. J. Blank et al., above n. 5, p. 20ff.
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can be subjected to (court imposed) professional youth
care interventions.
The clash of methods between the ‘hard core’ psycholo-
gists and the legal researchers translates as: should the
support activities by the family network members – lay
persons, on the whole – be conceived of as ‘intervention
techniques’ at all or as addressees of the law exercising
their legal rights? And if one were to compare the effec-
tiveness of both approaches (professional interventions
versus family group self-help) just the same, does not
the status of a right prevent randomisation here? Con-
versely, the RCT hardliner might say that any experi-
ment involving the EKC-supported experimental group
and a control group will in that case be (statistically)
biased.
Finally, project 2 (Court-referred Mediation) did not
involve economic analysis; this was rather a meta-analy-
sis of a number of domestic sociolegal studies from
across Europe on the practices of court referrals. A key
finding of this analysis was that more compulsion exer-
ted on litigants to take their case to mediation will result
in a smaller percentage of referred cases being settled
successfully. This finding led to some (friendly) ‘clash-
es’ with supervisory committee members with a back-
ground in public policy administration. For example,
the ‘public administrators’ opined that percentages only
give one side of the picture, whereas absolute numbers
may be more informative from a policy-making point of
view. More concrete: take a sample of 1,000 pending
court cases. If a voluntary referral scheme leads to 2%
referrals, whereby 75% of these referred cases are set-
tled successfully, this means that in the end, 15 cases are
taken out from the court dockets. If a mandatory referral
scheme leads (obviously) to 100% referrals and 15%
referred cases being settled successfully, that gives 150
cases taken out from the docket. This is ten times as
much. The ‘policy administrators’ emphasised that for
the development of a budgeting policy, the absolute
numbers would make it interesting to consider the man-
datory approach. From the legal researcher’s point of
view, however, the percentages were more important, as
these reveal that in mandatory referral schemes, 85% of
all litigants may have left the mediation room with a
feeling that they have been forced to waste their pre-
cious time; and these likely frustrated litigants may give
rise to growing negative publicity surrounding media-
tion, as demonstrated by historical surveys.10 Hence, it
seems, public policy administration engenders a short-
to- medium-term perspective, emphasising government
expenditure. By contrast, law engenders a long-term
perspective, emphasising that the desire to embrace
mediation too firmly (to generate savings) may withhold
too many too long from court access; thus, too firm an
embrace may ‘kill the baby’.
10. A. de Roo and R. Jagtenberg, Settling Labour Disputes in Europe
(1994), at 148ff., discussing some French longitudinal surveys in partic-
ular.
2.4 Synergy between Disciplines: Common
Contours Shining Through
At first sight, the conclusion seems warranted that these
projects, although involving various disciplines, do not
evidence any particular inter-discipline at work. At clos-
er inspection, that may be too rash a conclusion. Proj-
ects 2, 3, and 4 took place against a common background
of diverse approaches towards settling conflicts and
problems: approaches based on party autonomy and
approaches based on the authoritative intervention of an
outsider. Moreover, in projects 2 and 3, the autonomous
approaches converged on mediation and the authorita-
tive intervention on adjudication. In project 1, the
emphasis was on adjudication, but mediation (and other
ADR mechanisms) necessarily came to the fore here too,
in order to interpret figures accurately. Moreover, in
projects 3 and 4, where the views of parties directly
involved could be analysed, it appeared that conflicts
were also ignored or avoided or one of the parties just
gave in. Obviously, this whole range of options is always
present in the background, whenever one tries to
research the true role of judicial intervention in its prop-
er context. In addition, one comes to realise that in
order to explain the specific choice between mediation
(or negotiation-based strategies generally) and adjudica-
tion, more needs to be known about the strengths and
limitations of these approaches and about any (hidden)
interdependencies between these. All these aspects shine
through as contours of an inter-discipline in the making,
wherever the true role of adjudication is the object of
research. An inter-discipline in the making, not a vested
inter-discipline as yet, because it is, I believe, not suffi-
ciently clear yet which combination of methods emanat-
ing from which disciplines will appear as the most work-
able, consistent, and promising.
Any further discussion requires at least a brief introduc-
tion first to existing research into the range of conflict
approaches, their characteristics, and their interdepend-
ence.
3 Building Blocks of a Human
Conflict Inter-Discipline
So far some clashes and synergy between disciplines
were encountered within the four projects.
The disciplines combined within these four projects do
not represent all disciplines featured in research on the
range of human conflict strategies, notably in publica-
tions on the distinction between strategies involving
judicial intervention versus autonomous conflict resolu-
tion.
It makes sense to take a few steps back now, in order to
gain a more comprehensive overview of the develop-
ment of research generally, at the crossroads of judicial
and autonomous conflict resolution.
A summary reconstruction of disciplines that have con-
tributed to this field during the past 85 years suggests
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that early empirical insights generated by purely scien-
tific motives have become increasingly ‘hijacked’ for
practical application, especially since the rise of the
modern mediation movement. This does not need to
come as a surprise: research outcomes promoting auton-
omous resolution at the expense of judicial intervention
were welcome in the light of austerity packages that
have come to dominate the public sector (including the
judicial system) across the Western world since the rise
of Thatcherism and Reaganomics.
It is exactly this austerity bias in the amalgam of disci-
plines promoting autonomous over judicial conflict set-
tlement that calls for a revaluation of the discipline of
law. As pointed out in the second project I was involved
in (Court-referred Mediation), the very concept of rule
of law and equal protection under the law may thus
come under pressure. This would be particularly detri-
mental to one-shotters and (other) disadvantaged
addressees of the law.
A reorientation is necessary here, giving pride of place
to insights that have become underexposed or which
have newly emerged from critical countercurrents with-
in some of the empirical disciplines discussed. Some of
these useful insights are touched upon towards the end
of part 3.
A communis opinio on what constitutes the range of
human conflict strategies has been generated from with-
in ethology and conflict psychology. Walter Bradford
Cannon first described the so-called fight-or-flight
response to a perceived attack.11 His work was built
upon and refined in regard to complex human conflict
situations, inter alia by Blake and Mouton and notably
Dean Pruitt, and eventually led to what has become
known as the ‘conflict management grid’.12 Within this
grid, most authors today distinguish four main strat-
egies that people facing a conflict will choose from, that
is, a strategy of avoiding, yielding, solving, or confront-
ing.13 ‘Confronting’ is about trying to get one’s way one-
sidedly, overriding one’s opponent. This strategy
encompasses litigation in a court of law as a mild variety
and the use of brute force as a remnant of fight. ‘Solv-
ing’ implies that parties discuss together the real causes
of their problem and try to negotiate a mutually accepta-
ble solution, often by each of them taking something
and giving something else in return.14
3.1 Practical Application: The Mediation
Movement
In relations between sovereign states, negotiation is tra-
ditionally the primary strategy resorted to, as the use of
military force increasingly meets criticism in public
11. W. Cannon, Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear and Rage (1929).
12. R. Blake and J. Mouton, The Managerial Grid: Key Orientations for
Achieving Production through People (1964).
13. Dean Pruitt and his colleagues particularly. Inter alia: D. Pruitt, ‘Strategic
Choice in Negotiation’, in W. Breslin and J.Z. Rubin (eds.), Negotiation
Theory and Practice (1991), at 42-72. Pruitt uses ‘inaction’ instead of
‘avoiding’ and ‘contending’ instead of ‘confronting’.
14. There is a linear relationship between negotiation, mediation, arbitra-
tion, and litigation in that these methods imply an ever-decreasing
amount of control on the part of disputants.
opinion, whereas law is, as yet, a rudimentary edifice in
this area. In the 1950s, the US State Department com-
missioned Harvard researchers to find out whether its
diplomats could be turned into more effective negotia-
tors. The behavioural research that took place there
combined cognitive and conflict psychology with (math-
ematical) game theory analysis.15 The insights that were
gradually gained through experiments and analysis led
to the recognition that negotiation was not merely an art
to be practised by the talented but also has the potential
to become a science. Roger Fisher and William Ury’s
work on effective negotiation in itself became the basis
of the professional body of expert knowledge for mod-
ern mediators.16
Mediation represents one step up in the range of con-
flict management strategies from negotiation (solving) to
litigation (confronting) and is usually understood as a
process whereby a neutral assists disputants to find a
way out of deadlocked negotiations. From that perspec-
tive, modern mediation is a derivative of effective or
‘Harvard-style’ negotiation. Such effective negotiation
is based on a return to the underlying (possibly com-
mon) interests of the parties. Interests cannot be served
well if the cognitive abilities of parties are derailed by
strong emotions; ‘negative misattribution’ (attributing
an evil motive to whatever conduct the other party
engages in), ‘reactive devaluation’ (a party immediately
distrusts an offer because their adversary made it), and
‘judgmental overconfidence’ (having too high expecta-
tions about one’s prospects) are well-charted biases that
will likely constitute impediments for constructive
interest-based negotiations. Interests cannot be served
either if parties adopt fixed positions in the usual course
of conflict escalation. Such positions notably include
legal positions, firmly taken to defend one’s interests.
But (legal) positions are likely to start a life of their own.
The modern mediator has come to be regarded as being
able to impart, in a well-structured process, more effec-
tive negotiation skills onto parties that found themselves
mired in a dispute. This approach also carries the prom-
ise of empowerment of disputants; not only diplomats
but - more importantly - also common people, individu-
als, entangled in any kind of dispute, ranging from a
problematic divorce or a dismissal to a business partner
defaulting on a contract, may be turned into competent
and effective negotiators, through hands-on experience
under the guidance of a qualified mediator.
In the aforesaid areas, a comprehensive legal framework
tends to be present. This takes us to the domain of law,
to sociolegal studies, and to public policy administra-
tion. In such areas as discussed, litigation in a state-fun-
ded court always constitutes an option. In the 1980s, in
the USA initially (with the advent of Reaganomics),
scholars appeared on stage, highlighting the need to
curb public expenditure on the courts, by relieving the
15. Game theory plays a significant role in the work of H. Raiffa, The Art
and Science of Negotiation (1982).
16. R. Fisher and W. Ury, Getting to Yes. Negotiating Agreement without
Giving in (1981), and later editions.
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courts from the burden of their allegedly excessive case-
loads. Manning was one of those authors who pointed at
society becoming ever more litigious in his provocative
article ‘Hyper lexis’.17 Such publications sparked off a
debate with empirical sociologists like Marc Galanter
and William Felstiner, who argued, inter alia, that too
little was known as yet about the baseline of (legal) dis-
putes, the causes of disputes, and the obstacles that
addressees of the law had to overcome to have a case
registered in a law court, to make any generalisations
about litigiousness.18 Meanwhile, policymakers pursu-
ing an agenda of budgetary restraint teamed up with the
newly emerging profession of modern mediators, who
had absorbed the Harvard insights and were looking for
opportunities to put these into practice (and preferably
make a living). Through the work of Frank Sander, who
coined the notion of the ‘multi-door courthouse’, the
phenomenon of court-annexed mediation began to
develop, whereby judges would refer litigants to an
external, qualified mediator to see whether their prob-
lem could not be solved that way, instead of having the
case lingering through the court docket.19 Court-
annexed or court-referred mediation also rapidly spread
across Europe in the 1990s and early 2000s.20 Critical
sociologists have maintained that there is not a genuine
demand for the services of mediators rather that this is a
supplier-driven development.
At any rate, since policymakers were won to the idea
that judges, as public authorities, were to refer litigants
to the private sector (mediators are essentially self-
employed), surveys mapping customer satisfaction were
commissioned, and the need for professional-ethical
requirements for mediators was put on policy agenda’s
across Europe. Gradually more studies appeared, mostly
commissioned by government authorities, calculating
the costs involved in state-funded litigation, whereby
mediation became increasingly seen as a smart econo-
mising tool. In official documents, mediation was pre-
sented primarily as an additional option to achieve ‘jus-
tice’ for many. It is noteworthy that in many docu-
ments, the concept of ‘access to court’ became replaced
by ‘access to justice’.
3.2 The Austerity Bias
Overlooking this field, what seems to emerge is a patch-
work of connections between disciplines, referred to
here as conflict management studies. Thereby, only the
range of conflict options originally identified by etholo-
gy and refined by conflict psychologists appear as hav-
ing been inspired by purely scientific motives, that is,
curiosity, without a desire to put the accumulated
17. B. Manning, ‘Hyperlexis: Our National Disease’, Northwestern Universi-
ty Law Review, at 767ff. (1977).
18. W.L. Felstiner, R.L. Abel & A. Sarat, ‘The Emergence and Transforma-
tion of Disputes. Naming, Blaming, Claiming’, in K. Schuyt, K. Groenen-
dijk & B. Sloot (eds.), (15) Law & Society Review (1980); K. Schuyt, K.
Groenendijk & B. Sloot, De weg naar het recht (1976).
19. F.E.A. Sander, ‘Varieties of Dispute Processing’, in A.L. Levin and R.R.
Wheeler (eds.), The Pound Conference: Perspectives on Justice in the
Future (1979).
20. De Roo and Jagtenberg, above n. 6.
knowledge to immediate practical use. Harvard negotia-
tion research (based on conflict psychology and game
theory) was carried out for practical application (initially
in diplomacy) although it certainly has been conducive
to scientific knowledge accumulation that is empirical
findings that can be tested (also experimentally) by oth-
ers in the scientific community. The same applies to
most of the sociolegal studies into court-referred media-
tion. This particular amalgam of disciplines appears to
be sustained in a kind of symbiosis, incentivised by gov-
ernments and – where the courts are concerned – by
(disguised) austerity motives in particular.
Were the critical sociologists right then with their con-
clusion that mediation is simply supply driven? I believe
that goes too far. Although one may be distrustful of the
motives that have come to underlie the campaigns for
mediation, there is considerable evidence that dispu-
tants who have tried mediation are quite satisfied and
prepared to resort to mediation again in future disputes.
Also, mediations that are in no way connected to the
courts are growing in number. In that sense, mediation
and notably the underlying psychological insights and
empirical underpinnings definitely have something to
add to the whole spectrum of conflict resolution strat-
egies. In my view as a legal scholar, however, the cur-
rent symbiosis of disciplines is tilted too heavily towards
the austerity motive. To grow out into a genuine inter-
discipline, it will be necessary that aspects of conflict
strategies that have remained underexposed so far
(exactly due to the austerity focus) are taken on board
yet. Thereby, strategies such as ‘avoidance’ and ‘yield-
ing’ will pose a real challenge to legal researchers. The
same applies to the whole issue of costs. Are there costs
involved in avoidance or yielding? And costs for whom?
This aspect may be adequately tackled within economics
– thanks to new schools of thought that are developing –
exactly to address these underexposed, if not hidden,
aspects of reality.21 In the wake of the financial crisis, a
reorientation can also be observed within the domain of
policy administration and political science, where the
need for proper checks and balances is reasserted
again.22 I believe that by integrating these new orienta-
tions in research, the current bias in the amalgam of dis-
ciplines may be redressed, and research will become
what it should be, i.e. aimed at observing, understand-
ing, and possibly explaining the whole of reality. Such a
quarter-turn rotation away from the austerity agenda
will make conflict management studies a coherent and
sustainable inter-discipline that will prove extremely
valuable to legal research. Before going into that, I will
first indicate my personal assessment of the usefulness
of insights currently generated by mediation-focussed
research (as this is as yet the conflict strategy most
closely connected to the domain of law); this assessment
will be followed by an analysis of how the current
21. An important role is played here by the London-based New Economics
Foundation, confessing to ‘economics as if people and the planet mat-
tered’.
22. In the Netherlands, e.g. the 2011 RMO report Tegenkracht organiseren,
downloadable from the RMO website.
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insights have been incorporated (or not) in academic
legal research – the core theme of the symposium.
3.3 Useful Insights: A Personal Assessment
1 The Perspective of the Disputant
Pruitt’s conflict management grid and Felstiner’s con-
flict transformation pyramid help us in understanding
the disputant’s perspective. It is important to realise
that for disputants, litigation is often only an option of
last resort. Which preliminary choices does a disputant
make when facing a (legal) problem? Which quality does
a disputant regard essential in a ‘neutral’, and how will
this co-determine his or her strategy? How does a dispu-
tant react to early professional interventions? How do
conflicts (de-)escalate? When are they really solved, and
at what cost to the disputant? Here, legal practice and
legal academia can catch sight of the hinterland of the
legal services ‘market’, on which they both thrive. The
discussion on court-referred mediation particularly has
been conducive to various fundamental studies being
undertaken in the Netherlands, such as the Dispute
Resolution Delta (Geschilbeslechtingsdelta).23 In this
project, which is still continuing and expanding, stock
has been taken of what makes disputants decide for one
or the other strategy. In doing this, the ‘Delta’ consti-
tutes a more sophisticated and elaborated version of the
dispute resolution pyramid model developed by Felstin-
er and his colleagues (which distinguishes between just
three filters from the baseline upwards, i.e. disputants’
ability of naming, blaming, and claiming).
2 The Notion of Interests
The ‘interests’ notion is not wholly absent in the law –
in substantive law, for example, in the relativity require-
ment for tort liability or the abuse of right doctrine, in
procedural law in the requirement of standing. But the
ambit of the ‘interests’ notion as used in Harvard nego-
tiation theory is much wider. Disputants who have wal-
led themselves into a legal position may lose sight of
their underlying interests. This becomes even more
likely once a lawyer takes over, because the lawyer will
urge the disputant to reduce his reality, that is, to dis-
card feelings (that the disputant would love to vent) and
to discard all those facts that do not support a legal posi-
tion to be taken in court.24 Keeping the parties focused
on their interests as in mediation may indeed deliver
solutions that serve both parties’ interests in an optimal
fashion, though not necessarily in all cases.
3 The Role of Professional Neutrals, How These Are
Financed and What Their Interests Are
The debate on pros and cons of mediation in compari-
son with in-court adjudication has led researchers to
touch upon the sensitive – but important - topic of pro-
fessional self-interest. The critics of mediation have
23. B.C.J. van Velthoven and M. ter Voert, Geschilbeslechtingsdelta 2003
(2004). Also: Hazel Genn, Paths to Justice (1999).
24. A. de Roo and R. Jagtenberg, ‘The Relevance of Truth, the Case of
Mediation vs. Litigation’, in R. van Rhee & A. Uzelac (eds.), Truth and
Efficiency in Civil Litigation (2012), at 1-20.
never ceased to point at the mediator’s need to make a
living and to do about everything to secure a steady
influx of cases.25 The continuous surveys on mediator
performance, customer satisfaction, and ethical require-
ments as monitored by supervisory bodies have eventu-
ally reverberated; it seems, into the domain of the judi-
ciary as well. Although mediators as an emerging pro-
fession are still under more scrutiny than judges as an
established profession, judicial strategic behaviour does
no longer escape the attention of researchers.26 As one
British scholar summarised: ‘The problem is that judges
have too many cases, and mediators have too few.’27 Not
only considerations of caseload and (fixed) income play
a role: the personal feelings of judges about mediation
and about their own professional role likewise appear to
play a role in their willingness to refer litigants to medi-
ation or to do the opposite. This has been an interesting
insight in project 2 particularly, where we were confron-
ted with erratically jumping patterns of court referrals,
notably in France; investigating these more in depth,
evidence was retrieved about the decisive role of the
personal enthusiasm (or otherwise) of individual judges
– despite a uniform regulatory regime.28 And then there
are the financial incentives and constraints for publicly
funded judges and for self-employed mediators. Put
briefly: judges will be tempted to attune their output to
fit their fixed salary or budget, by minimising labour-
intensive work on cases; mediators will try to secure
output any way they can so as to maximise their income.
So both professions may be prone to strategic behav-
iour.29
4 Costs and Returns for Various Groups of
Stakeholders
Disputants inter se, disputants and a mediator, or dis-
putants and a judge may be regarded as the actors who
are directly involved in the activity of dispute resolu-
tion. In an economic sense, the activity could be regar-
ded as a ‘transaction’ that may give rise to positive or
negative ‘externalities’: other people further afield may
benefit from or may be harmed by the approach taken
by those directly involved. This may be society as a
whole, and it may also be a corporate entity, an organi-
sation as a whole, such as (returning to project 3 for a
moment) the Netherlands police force. Daniel Dana has
been among the pioneers to design tools for calculating
25. N.J. Huls, ‘De aanbodeconomie van ADR; mediation kritisch
beschouwd’, (9) Justitiële Verkenningen, at 99-107 (2000).
26. R. Jagtenberg and A. de Roo, ‘Mediation and the Concepts of Account-
ability, Accessibility and Efficiency’, in R. van Rhee and A. Uzelac (eds.),
Access to Justice and the Judiciary (2009), at 149-71.
27. R. Ingleby, ‘Court-Sponsored Mediation; the Case against Mandatory
Participation’, Modern Law Review, at 441-51 (1993).
28. H. Touzard, M. Bastounis & I. Benharda-Piget, Les représentations
socials du règlement des litiges. Le cas des modes alternatifs (avril
2001).
29. On the judiciary, see A. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer. Failing Ideals of the
Legal Profession (1995); on mediators: B. Baarsma, Blijft mediation de
eeuwige belofte of wordt het een volwassen markt? (2011).
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the costs of escalating organisational conflict.30 In proj-
ect 3, we have built upon Dana’s findings, developing
his model into different directions, inter alia, so as to
include the costs for individual employees. In regard to
projects 1, 2, and 4, it would be extremely relevant to
chart where costs and returns would arise elsewhere in
society. In project 4, for example, enhancing the prob-
lem-solving power of family networks could be condu-
cive to a growth in ‘social capital’.31 Newly engineered
research methods such as social return on investment
(SROI) analysis make it possible to monetise ‘value’
effects of actions for stakeholders elsewhere in society,
in a fairly reliable manner, thus enabling to deal with the
‘whose costs?’ question less one-sidedly and more com-
prehensively.32 In regard to projects 1 and 2, where the
choice is between adjudication in the public domain and
negotiation in a private conference room, many more
aspects could thus be brought to bear, such as the social
returns generated by a well-functioning judiciary.33 The
words of warning that Yale law school president Antho-
ny Kronman already expressed in the 1990s against the
one-sidedness of ‘managerial judging’ may then finally
receive a satisfactory answer. Kronman observed that
managerial judging is essentially a program of economic
reform, premised on the belief that a reallocation of
judicial effort from the courtroom to the conference
table can mitigate the inefficiencies of the queue-based
system of adjudication and thereby increase the amount
of justice that the courts are able to produce with the
resources committed to them. But, Kronman wonders,
is it really clear what exactly a judge seeks to maximise
(in comparison to – for example – a manufacturer of
pencils)? The ‘commensurating drive’ of (orthodox)
economics, i.e. to translate all inputs with different qual-
ities into the single property of costing money, may seri-
ously distort this strive for increased efficiency. In con-
flicts over fundamental values, it may be better exactly
not to wrench these out of the perspective in which they
are viewed by the parties.34
30. Annie de Roo, ‘Interview with Dr. Daniel Dana; The Inventor of Finan-
cial Cost of Organizational Conflict and the Advocate of Self-Media-
tion’, 3 Nederlands-Vlaams tijdschrift voor mediation en conflictma-
nagement, at 6-16 (2008).
31. R. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American
Community (2000).
32. J. Nicholls et al., A Guide to Social Return on Investment (2012).
33. A.H. van Delden, Wat is de rechter waard? Rechtspraaklezing (2006).
34. Kronman, above n. 29, at pp. 338-40. Reference is also made to R.
Dworkin, ‘Is Wealth a Value?’, 9 Journal of Legal Studies, at 191 ff.
(1980); D. Scheele, Doelmatigheid in de rechtshuishouding; een
rechtseconomische anlyse (2006).




From here, it is a small step into legal practice and legal
academic scholarship to take stock of how the insights
and findings of the current amalgam of research into
alternative modes of dispute resolution (tilted as it is
towards austerity agenda’s) have been incorporated or
not.
4.1 The Incorporation in Legal Practice
Since legal practice largely constitutes the object as well
as the audience for doctrinal academic legal research, it
makes sense to start this investigation into the incorpo-
ration issue here. In so doing, I will have to confine
myself to the Netherlands, since the research projects
had been commissioned by the Netherlands’ govern-
ment for valorisation in this country.35 The nationwide
experiments that took place during the first decade of
this century have resulted in the incorporation of media-
tion facilities in all courts, except the Supreme Court.
This reflects recognition of at least the next adjacent
mode of dispute resolution, i.e. negotiation-based medi-
ation, as a valid alternative for a number of disputants.
This ‘institutional’ incorporation, in turn, has led to
some further incorporation of findings and ideas in the
daily practice of judges and of lawyers in private prac-
tice (advocatuur). This is important, because one can
have a facility, but a facility will be used only if it is alive
in the minds of its potential users. Apart from the dis-
putants themselves, one could say that the key actors in
referrals are judges and, at an earlier stage, the lawyers
engaged by disputants. Among the judiciary, some
selective incorporation can be observed. The insight
that (sometimes) qualitatively better solutions can be
achieved through mediation has been instrumental for
some Dutch courts to embark on multi-annual experi-
ments with a so-called conflict diagnosis model, devel-
oped largely by psychologist Martin Euwema.36 The
experiment fits in with a newly developed concept, con-
flictbeslechting op maat, that is, tailor-made dispute reso-
lution. The underlying idea is, obviously, that it is pos-
sible to diagnose which dispute strategy is best in which
case: mediation or adjudication. This experiment takes
place at the moment parties have submitted their case to
court. Cooperation in this experiment is voluntary for
judges and in that sense self-selective: judges who are
indifferent or even opposed to mediation will not take
part anyway. At any rate, one could argue, with refer-
35. For an international overview, reference is made to A. de Roo and R.
Jagtenberg, ‘Professional(s as) Mediators: Emerging Markets and the
Quality of Legal Protection’, in A. Uzelac and C.H. van Rhee (eds.), The
Landscape of the Legal Professions in Europe and the USA: Continuity
and Change (2011), at 235-54.
36. M. Pel and S. Verberk (eds.), De pilots ‘Conflictoplossing op maat’.
Reflectie op resultaten en ideeën voor de toekomst (2009).
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ence to the dispute resolution pyramid concept, that the
courtroom is already many steps away from the very
baseline where the conflict arose for the first time.
In the lower regions of the dispute resolution pyramid,
however, incorporation can be observed too, notably
among lawyers. Lawyers must be aware that, if they
pursue their client’s case in court, judges may raise
mediation as an option that might be considered. As an
enterprising professional, lawyers have to anticipate that
question, and so, they will have to discuss mediation as
an option long before with their client, so as not to be
taken by surprise in court. It is less relevant, I think, to
dwell on the possible motives for lawyers to raise the
mediation option directly with their clients; whether
they genuinely believe this may be a better avenue,
whether they feel it can be used as defensive marketing,
or whether mediation could fit in a ‘appearing reasona-
ble’ strategy: in all instances, mediation and the under-
lying insights from conflict psychology are finding their
way down the lower regions of the dispute resolution
pyramid.37 My colleagues and I have coined this phe-
nomenon as ‘the shadow of the referral’, a designation
that builds on Robert Mnookin’s famous concept of ‘the
shadow of the law’.38
One may wonder whether still lower down in the dis-
pute resolution pyramid, also in-house counsels, that is,
corporate lawyers and government lawyers, have incor-
porated the findings generated by the amalgam of disci-
plines described above. From the agendas of relevant
professional associations, various reports, and experi-
ments, it appears that there is at least a growing aware-
ness of the need to consider more alternative methods,
which each may have their rationale. Interestingly, how-
ever, the larger the corporation or government body, the
less such an entity appears to be inclined to acknowledge
the potential benefits of independent mediators. There
is a clear tendency for such ‘big players’ to either deploy
their own in-house mediators or merely to incorporate
the insights and negotiation skills into their own HRM
training programs, thus turning these into the function-
al capabilities required from their staff.39
4.2 The Incorporation in Academic Legal
Scholarship
Again, I will confine myself to the Netherlands here.
Moreover, even within this single jurisdiction, it will be
obvious that a thorough analysis of all academic legal
37. A further consideration pro mediation might be its finality: various sur-
veys that found a much better compliance record for mediated settle-
ments once achieved than for court verdicts. See L. Combrink-Kuiters et
al., Ruimte voor mediation, WODC Onderzoek en Beleid, nr. 210,
(2003).
38. R. Mnookin and L. Kornhauser, ‘Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law’,
Yale Law Journal, at 88 ff. (1979); Courts may render judgments in
only a fraction of all meritorious cases that emerge at the baseline of
society. But the effect of those judgments will be much wider and also
set the parameters for those disputants who follow the strategy of
negotiation or mediation.
39. De Roo and Jagtenberg, above n. 35. Also D.B. Lipsky and R.L. Seeber,
‘In Search of Control: the Corporate Embrace of ADR’, University of
Pennsylvania Journal of Labour and Employment Law, at 133-57
(1998).
research is physically impossible. A simple illustration:
compiling the 2009 evaluation report on legal research
in the Netherlands (the Koers Committee report Kwali-
teit & Diversiteit) took a whole year.40 I will instead con-
centrate on the Grosskommentar par excellence for Dutch
private law, the Asser series, and on the best known
handbooks on the law of civil procedure. At this point,
the international ELR readership may be tempted to
scrutinise their domestic doctrinal works in a similar
vein.
With regard to the Netherlands, it is interesting to read
in the Koers Committee report that a clear shift can be
observed from mono-disciplinary to multidisciplinary
research, that there is more attention for methodological
issues than a decade before, and that legal research is
increasingly financed through external research funds
for which researchers have to compete with each other.
Turning to the Asser series first: in this voluminous ser-
ies, only one volume addresses the plurality of dispute
resolution methods in some detail, that is, the 2005
Algemeen Deel, the ‘General part’ of the series, edited by
Jan Vranken, Professor of Law at Tilburg University
and Advocate-General with the Netherlands Supreme
Court.41 The issue of comparing modes of dispute reso-
lution features in a chapter entitled ‘the move away from
the state-funded judge’ (Weg van de overheidsrechter). It
is noteworthy that Vranken had already been involved as
one of three leading legal scholars in a project on funda-
mental reassessment of civil procedure (de Fundamentele
Herbezinning), a project that also aimed to integrate rele-
vant sociolegal findings and insights from psychology.42
In the Asser series volume, Vranken characterises medi-
ation as ‘the most radical’ of all other alternatives to
adjudication, in ‘its exclusive focus on the individual’,
and solving the individual’s conflict by addressing
underlying personal interests, including human emo-
tion. However, Vranken continues, this also seems a
weakness of mediation; it is too much inward looking
and lacking in transparency. This is worrying because at
the same time there may be a connection with law, nota-
bly where legal rules constitute a standard for objectivity
that a mediator may bring in to circumvent negative
misattribution. Where the law comes in, mediation
should be much better regulated, according to Vranken,
if only to guarantee that each disputant is granted equal
opportunities. The bottom line is, according to Vran-
ken, that it is questionable whether one can safely
assume, as mediation does, that average human beings
are able to oversee their own problems and to take
rational steps.
40. A.W. Koers et al., Kwaliteit en Diversiteit: Rechtswetenschappelijk
Onderzoek in Nederland – Rapport van de Evaluatiecommissie
Rechtswetenschappelijk Onderzoek, Amsterdam: VU, 2009 (432
pages).
41. J.B.M. Vranken, Mr. C. Asser’s Handleiding tot de Beoefening van het
Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht. Algemeen Deel – Een Vervolg (2005).
42. M. Barendrecht and A. Klijn, Balanceren en Vernieuwen, Een Kaart voor
Sociaal-Wetenschappelijke Kennis voor de Fundamentele Herbezinning
Procesrecht (2004).
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In view of legal standards possibly playing a role when it
comes to infusing objectivity in the mediation process,
Vranken thus concludes that mediation should become
the object of more (legal) regulation. To some extent, as
I will come to illustrate below, this desideratum has
been taken on board in the draft bill on mediation that
has been introduced by former MP Van der Steur, pres-
ently the Minister of Security and Justice.
First, however, two authoritative handbooks on civil
procedural law are to be reviewed on the incorporation
issue. Hugenholtz-Heemskerk (2012 edition, 350 pages)
devote half a page to mediation in a chapter entitled:
‘arbitration and expert determination’ (arbitrage en bin-
dend advies).43 This is curious, as arbitration and deter-
mination constitute methods whereby a decision is being
imposed to end the conflict. Viewed against the basic
range of dispute resolution methods, these are rather
shades of grey within the confrontational strategy, casu
quo litigation. The chapter on mediation has a very
introductory character and focuses on the courts as
agents of referral of intending litigants. The source
material in the footnotes consists almost exclusively of
commentaries written by authors with a background in
law. Likewise the well-known handbook by Snijders and
his colleagues (2011 edition, over 600 pages).44 Here
about three pages are devoted to mediation in a chapter
entitled ‘private means of recourse to law’ (private
rechtsgangen). Again, this is curious as mediation, and
negotiation-based strategies generally are not modes of
recourse to the law. Again, the source material incorpo-
rated in the footnotes consists almost exclusively of
commentaries written by lawyers. In addition, Snijders
et al. have included some Supreme Court judgments on
mediation, in relation to court procedure. For complete-
ness sake: neither Snijders and his colleagues nor
Hugenholtz-Heemskerk have separate entries on
(direct) negotiation, as the most pure variety of a ‘prob-
lem solving’ strategy.
The conclusion seems justified that other modes of dis-
pute resolution as exposed in conflict management stud-
ies are essentially ‘cannibalised’ in publications that
adopt an internal perspective on the law, i.e. doctrinal
legal academic writing. The available information is
fundamentally reduced and translated into the perspec-
tive and language of the law, so as to make it fit the law’s
disciplinary straightjacket.
Authors who attempt to adopt an external perspective
albeit for just a moment (like Vranken) appear to be
inclined to resort to regulation, in order to make media-
tion concordant with the law. It is interesting to note
that Vranken did not mention any need for direct nego-
tiation to be regulated.
Finally, it is noticeable that hitherto, only one professo-
rial chair on dispute resolution methods has been estab-
lished within a law faculty thus far (i.e. the Free Univer-
sity of Amsterdam); at closer inspection, however, it
43. W.H. Heemskerk, Hoofdlijnen van het Nederlands Burgerlijk Proces-
recht (23rd edn) (2012), at 223ff.
44. H.J. Snijders et al., Nederlands Burgerlijk Procesrecht (5th edn) (2011).
appears that the focus of that chair is on intervention by
expert witnesses in court procedures. A more compre-
hensive program that was established some years ago at
another university (Utrecht) has been largely disman-
tled already, due to major budgetary cutbacks.
4.3 The Legislator Role and the Role of the
Legislator
Understood in its broad meaning, doctrinal academic
legal research includes the formulation of recommenda-
tions for legislation, i.e. the researcher assuming a ‘legis-
lator role’. In regard to project 2, discussions took place
in the years following the nationwide experiments men-
tioned above as to how to structure court-referred medi-
ation in the Netherlands.
It soon became clear that certain quarters were pushing
for a more mandatory referral scheme, to be introduced
in Dutch law. Elsewhere in Europe, mandatory referral
had already been introduced, notably in Italy. In the
Netherlands, the former MP Van der Steur initially
sought inspiration in Italy for his proposals on media-
tion legislation. Actually, Mr. Van der Steur’s proposals
concern three different subjects (contained in three dif-
ferent bills): one bill seeks to regulate the profession of
mediator.45 In the wake of a 2008 European Directive
seeking to establish a professional privilege for media-
tors, without however regulating the professional
requirements for mediators, the first bill aims to create a
legally protected professional title: registermediator or
RegM (registered mediator). A RegM will have to com-
ply with strict professional requirements, inter alia a
minimum of legal knowledge and a minimum of practi-
cal experience, in order to be registered in a new system
under the aegis of the Minister of Justice. Professional
privilege will only accrue to RegMs; courts may only
refer litigants to RegMs; and RegMs will be given the
power to liaise directly with the courts when a legal
issue arises during mediation or whenever parties seek
to have their settlement being made enforceable. So far,
the desideratum expressed by Vranken has received a
follow-up, it seems. The second Van der Steur bill aims
to ‘anchor’ mediation firmly in civil procedure.46 To
this end, the bill ties mediation in with the legal process
in various ways. It provides that in the writ of summons,
the claimant will have to explain why mediation has not
been attempted. The judge may then decide to refer the
case to mediation yet, if in his opinion the case would
lend itself to mediation. Moreover, disputes will be pre-
sumed to be suitable for mediation whenever they
involve a ‘relational’ aspect; this includes at any rate all
contractual disputes. The third Van der Steur bill con-
tains comparable provisions for administrative law pro-
cedure, albeit that there the government party will have
to clarify whether it sees mediation as an option.47
It is interesting to see that the second bill attempts to
make mediation less voluntary, in the context of court
procedure. In so doing, my impression is that the really
45. Wetsvoorstel (Bill) nr. 33722.
46. Wetsvoorstel (Bill) nr. 33723.
47. Wetsvoorstel (Bill) nr. 33727.
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important findings and insights from conflict manage-
ment studies have not been incorporated or have been
incorporated only selectively.
The primary criticism that my colleagues and I have
expressed in various publications is that the dispute res-
olution pyramid model illustrates a bias among policy-
makers in Ministries of Justice and now even in Parlia-
ment.48 They are entirely focused on the issue of how to
signpost a very small group away from the courtroom to
a mediation conference room. This is the small group of
intending litigants who have made a number of choices
already underway, from the pyramid baseline all the way
up, and who have now finally reached the courts. The
Dutch Dispute Resolution Delta survey estimates that
this group constitutes less than 4% of all disputants who
have become involved in a legal dispute. But then, gov-
ernmental policymakers will argue that they simply do
not have a mandate for addressing the lower regions of
the dispute pyramid. That point has been made at sev-
eral occasions. In regard to the Van der Steur legislative
proposals particularly, my colleagues and I also found,
drawing upon the disputant perspective again, that poli-
cymakers arguing in favour of mandatory referral love to
highlight frivolous cases that obviously do not ‘belong’
in a court. But how about the cases that do ‘belong’ in
court but never got there and perhaps never got there
because the litigants were persuaded to drop a potentially
interesting legal argument for a private settlement nego-
tiated somewhere in a conference room, thus for per-
verse reasons (intimidation, lack of resources)? This
aspect should also be borne in mind by the legislator:
Are we sufficiently aware of the danger of compulsion,
which may prevent issues to come out into the open that
should indeed have been made public?
The crucial question then becomes: who decides on what
basis which issues in which disputes exactly lend them-
selves for adjudication and which for private negotiation
(whether or not with the assistance of a mediator)? It is
important to underline that an evidence-based frame-
work for assessing the appropriateness of different con-
flict strategies accurately is simply still lacking.
These observations by my colleagues and myself have
been taken on board by the Netherlands Council of
State (Raad van State).49 Yet it remains to be seen
whether the proposals will be amended, in view of such
mere scientific considerations. There is still the tilting
towards the austerity agenda that can be uncovered
behind the proposals, possibly enhanced by some lobby-
ism from certain segments within the mediator com-
munity.
48. A. de Roo and R. Jagtenberg, ‘Quasi-vrijwillige Mediation; Enkele Kant-
tekeningen bij de Initiatiefwetsvoorstellen Mediation’, 17(2) Neder-
lands-Vlaams Tijdschrift voor Mediation en Conflictmanagement, at
35ff. (2013).
49. Raad van State, Advies W03.13.0323, 0324 en 0325/II, d.d. 22
November 2013.
5 The Case for ‘Reverse
Incorporation’
The conclusion so far must be that doctrinal academic
legal research has hardly incorporated the empirical
foundation of conflict management studies full scale.
Only some findings pertaining to mediation, as the
alternative directly adjacent to adjudication, have found
their way into legal literature but only to the extent that
courts may refer litigants to mediation, and then still,
only the legal intricacies were on the minds of legal doc-
trinal authors. Vranken expressed a need for regulation
as he held mediation to be too narrow in outlook; that is
to say too much focussed on the feelings and percep-
tions of the individual and caring too little about
inequality compensation. This is intriguing as the advo-
cates of mediation would exactly find the legal approach
to be too narrow, reducing the complexity of human
conflict to make it fit within a legal straightjacket while
hardly caring at all about the individual disputant. In
my view, this quandary cannot be solved unless and
until the disciplines relevant to conflict resolution have
developed a better understanding for each other and
some of the selective orientations within each of these
disciplines will have been addressed. Most of all, the
disguised tilt towards the austerity agenda must be elim-
inated from the current amalgam of disciplines, in order
to give it a purely scientific, consistent, and sustainable
basis that will allow it to develop into a genuine inter-
discipline (‘conflict management studies’). I will hint at
some of these selective orientations and misunderstand-
ings first and sketch what sort of questions I think
should be on the research agenda of a genuine inter-dis-
cipline for the next ten years. I will then conclude this
article with some reflections as to how doctrinal legal
research could find a proper place within this new inter-
discipline.
5.1 Getting Things Straight and Restoring the
Vista
Let us start this short impression within the discipline
of law, quoting Owen Fiss, from his 1981 landmark con-
tribution to the ADR debate, ‘Against Settlement’:50
‘The social function of the lawsuit is to explicate and
give force to the values embodied in authoritative legal
texts; in case of settlements, society gets less than what
appears, and for a price it does not know it is paying.’
There are at least two points to be made here. First, in
much litigation, neither the facts are self-evident nor is
the law unequivocally clear; think, for example, of those
frequent cases where both parties have acted negligent-
ly. This aspect is also missed in the economic analysis of
law. Viewing legal rules as an institutional framework
for the market, economists seem to presuppose that
cases and rules are always crystal clear. Negotiations in
the shadow of the law are therefore disqualified as a ‘you
50. O. Fiss, ‘Against Settlement’, 93 The Yale Law Journal (1984).
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quit first game’, that may disincentivise efficiency.51 It is
often a fact of life, however, that disputants are justifia-
bly struggling how to offset the uncertain outcome of
litigation against the certainty of a settlement. Are the
psychologists, who have played such a dominant role in
furthering modern mediation, right then? The insight
that mechanisms in our brain may prevent us from a
constructive approach in conflict situations is highly
valuable, but conflicts are not only about cognitive defi-
ciencies. Many (and probably most) conflicts are also
about conflicting tangible interests that may be so
important that laws have been made to protect these.
Hence, sometimes the psychologists’ perspective may be
too ‘micro’ indeed. Harm may be caused not only to an
easily impressed disputant but also to an organisation or
society at large if cognition is overemphasised. Back to
Owen Fiss then and the concept of externalities? But
how does law and economics deal with vertical relation-
ships, that is, where the law bestows power to particular
functionaries and makes such functionaries practically
invulnerable? In the present era of financial crisis, cases
come to the fore almost on a daily basis where political
or business leaders found the law on their side when
their subordinated opponents sought to blow the whistle
about negative externalities arising elsewhere in society.
Is this the law that Owen Fiss seeks to uphold? There is
some psychology involved in here too.52 Quoting from
an interview I had with Daniel Dana in 2008, on the
absence of rational systemic approaches to deal with
organisational conflict: ‘Who really cares about costs? It
is discouraging that seemingly no one cares. You would
expect shareholders to care. But I don’t think they will,
because the personal embarrassment when attention is
drawn to a conflict is a higher personal priority in the
moment than the longer term financial consequences of
the conflict experienced.’
Open conflict, in other words, is taboo. This takes us to
the full-scale range of conflict management approaches,
notably the options of avoiding and yielding, and the
costs these may entail; these are all notorious blind spots
in legal research. I would say that multidisciplinary
research on conflicts should be redirected to these
aspects; such research would materialise the breakaway
from the austerity agenda, which is set by those in pow-
er defining which costs are to be regarded as costs; at the
same time, such reorientation may yield significant
social returns. In the slightly longer run, it may be
instrumental in setting the amalgam of disciplines
‘upright’ again, allowing it to develop critical thrust for
the way forward in conflict knowledge.
5.2 In Conclusion: How Would Legal Research
Fit into This New Inter-Discipline?
A key feature of the new inter-discipline in the making
is the disputant perspective. This perspective does not
51. For example, the economic analysis of the provisions on ‘hardship’ in
the Principles of European Contract Law and the Draft Common Frame
of Reference; F. Chirico and P. Larouche, Economic Analysis of the
DCFR (2010).
52. And psychiatry as well: R. Babiak and R. Hare, Snakes in Suits (2008).
rule out that, in addition, the judicial or legislator per-
spective can be adopted, but the disputant perspective is
crucial if one is to get the complete picture of conflict
strategies available.
Interestingly, lawyers in private practice are more accus-
tomed to connect the disputant perspective to the judi-
cial perspective. As Susskind has argued in his provoca-
tive essay ‘The End of Lawyers?’, in order to survive, it
is only becoming more and more important for lawyers
to take cognisance of the disputant, that is, their client’s
perspective.53 The legal services market is becoming
extremely competitive, and information technology and
ADR are increasingly making inroads on traditional
legal work.
Since legal practice is the object and also the target audi-
ence of doctrinal legal research, this cannot remain
without consequences. It may force academic doctrinal
researchers not only to think more outside the legal box
but also, and paradoxically perhaps, to think even more
from a lawyer’s client perspective. After all, published
court reports hardly ever tell us what the dispute was
really about; in continental European countries, the suc-
cinctness of those reports may even have cut out a
wealth of legal arguments that were actually used inside
the court room, under the pressure of judicial perform-
ance indicators (the tilt towards austerity) that require a
swift result that lend itself for accounting purposes. To
be sure, the need to sit next to the client/disputant, as it
were, will likely impose some methodological challeng-
es. Ideally, also this kind of research should extend over
different jurisdictions, selected not only on the basis of
traditional cultures but also of expected differences in
economic pressure on the judiciary.54
Doctrinal legal research will also be incentivised to
move up this way, that is, adopting the disputant’s per-
spective, by the changing structure of academic research
itself. It may be sobering to learn that Europe’s primary
financier of academic research today, the European
Research Council (ERC), distinguishes between only
three main branches of research: (1) physical sciences
and engineering (44% budget share), life sciences (med-
icine, biology) (39% budget share), and social sciences
and humanities (17% budget share). Law is not even
recognised as a subdomain of research in its own right,
but always linked to one or more specific sub-branches
of the social sciences. The upshot is that legal research-
ers will have to demonstrate what exactly they are add-
ing to solve the problems of the real world, and this
requires the cooperation with empirical disciplines, tout
court. To conclude on a recurring theme in this article:
not only is the behaviour of lawyers, judges, and media-
tors influenced by the financial structure in which they
work, the same applies to legal academics!
53. R. Susskind, The End of Lawyers? (2008).
54. There are strong indications that the legal parameters for the profession
of lawyers has changed in correlation to a more liberal or more protec-
tionist outlook of the economy, in the past. For a comparative insight,
see R. Jagtenberg and A. de Roo, ‘Internationalisation of Legal Services
and Markets in Europe and Asia’, Japon in Extenso, Poitiers, no. 47-48,
at 36 ff. (mars-juin 1998).
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The point I want to make however goes beyond the
mere necessity for doctrinal legal researchers to subsume
their research under a broader interdisciplinary heading;
I find it also desirable for both legal and for empirical
researchers that such a reverse incorporation material-
ises, ironically perhaps to countervail some tendencies
towards one-sidedness that can be observed within
empirical research focussed on human conflict. As dis-
cussed above in paragraph 2.3 (clashes between disci-
plines), my own experience is that legal doctrinal
research, exactly because of its normative stance, has
something crucial to add to the ‘naked data’ that are col-
lected through the restrained prisms of distinct empiri-
cal subdisciplines, particularly where empirical studies
are tilted by the austerity motive – think of the misgui-
ded conclusions based on mere productivity data of
courts or the absolute quantity of compulsory settle-
ments. After all: the ‘ought’ of the law is in itself a part
of the real world too.
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